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The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect  of corruption in bank lending. 
Corruption  is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely  related to legal 
enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’  willingness to lend. 
Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for  bank lending of law 
enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only  judiciary 
corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank 
lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. 
This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk 
aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. 
We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these 
assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, 
bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when 
bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption 
fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank 
credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall 
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The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of corruption in bank lending. This 
investigation is motivated by the widespread evidence showing the beneficial effect of 
bank lending on economic growth (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza and 
Beck, 2000). In line with this finding, a large body of research has analyzed the 
determinants of bank lending and has underlined the role of legal institutions such as 
law enforcement and legal origin (Levine, 1999; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 
2003; Djankov, Mc Liesh and Shleifer, 2007). 
However there has been no research done on the impact of corruption on bank 
lending. This gap is surprising considering the strong link between law enforcement 
and corruption. Indeed, corruption reduces law enforcement by rendering more 
difficult the functioning of courts and more generally of public administration taking 
care of the application of laws.
2
Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law 
enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they  only  consider judiciary 
corruption. Corruption is not limited to the misuse of public office, as made clear in 
its  usual  definition  as  provided by Transparency International: “the misuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”. It can also take place in lending through bribes 
given to bank officials to receive a loan, as observed by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine (2006) and Barth et al. (2008). 
 Law enforcement plays a role in bank credit, as the 
ability of banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers enhances their 
willingness to lend. Corruption is similarly expected to reduce banks’ willingness to 
lend, as it is associated with greater uncertainty of enforcement of lenders’ claims in 
courts in case of default. 
While corruption in public administration is expected to have a negative impact 
on bank credit, the role of corruption in lending is not straightforward. It can be 
viewed as an obstacle to finance, as it acts as a tax on loans for borrowers by 
increasing the cost of the loan. However, this argument assumes that the bribe is 
required by the bank official and yet the borrower may take the initiative to propose a 
bribe to enhance his chances to receive the loan. In the latter case, corruption may 
favor bank lending and hence have a different impact than other legal dimensions 
such as law enforcement. 
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We examine the validity based on macro and micro evidence of these  two 
contrasting views of the effect of corruption on bank lending. We perform a country-
level analysis to investigate the influence of corruption at the macro level, in line with 
the cross-country papers on the determinants of bank lending (e.g. Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer, 2007). We can thus check whether corruption exerts a similar impact on 
bank lending as do other institutional factors. 
We then turn to a bank-level investigation to check on and delve deeper into our 
macro findings. The positive impact of corruption on lending is dependent of the 
borrowers’ willingness to give bribes to obtain a loan. This behavior appears more 
likely in the presence of greater risk aversion by banks, leading to more rejected loan 
applications. We therefore test whether the degree of bank risk aversion affects the 
impact of corruption on bank lending. Furthermore, even if corruption favors bank 
lending by reducing banks’ reluctance to grant loans, it may not be beneficial for 
economic growth, if it merely expands the volume of bad loans. Indeed borrowers 
may give bribes to bank officials only to obtain excessively risky loans. As a 
consequence, we check whether the effect  of corruption on bank lending differs 
according with the quality of loans. 
We thereby contribute to the literature on determinants of bank lending, but we 
also  provide  a significant contribution to the literature on corruption. Indeed this 
burgeoning literature has analyzed a wide range of consequences of corruption (e.g. 
Mauro, 1995, and Méon and Sekkat, 2005, on growth, Lambsdorff, 2003, on 
productivity, Wei, 2000, on foreign direct investment), but never, to our knowledge, 
for bank lending. In this literature, the argument that corruption may be positively 
associated with bank credit can be related to the “grease the wheels hypothesis” 
according to which corruption may be beneficial in a second best world by alleviating 
the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). 
This hypothesis considers that an inefficient public administration constitutes a major 
impediment to economic activity  and  that  a dose of “greasing” money may help 
circumvent. As a consequence, corruption may be less detrimental, or even beneficial, 
in countries plagued by  defective bureaucracy. Under  similar reasoning, our 
investigation checks whether corruption may grease the wheels of banks plagued with 
excessive risk aversion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the elements 
from the literature that may be related to the impact of corruption on bank lending.    - 4 -  - 
 
 
Section III develops our empirical investigation at the country level. In section IV, we 
report the empirical tests at the bank level. We then provide some concluding remarks 
in section V. 
 
II. Corruption and bank lending linkages 
The key argument as to why corruption should hamper bank credit is based on 
the law and finance theory pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997). Legal institutions 
protecting banks and enforcing contracts are likely to encourage greater bank credit, 
by increasing banks’ willingness to grant loans. In case of default by a borrower, the 
bank may wish to force repayment, to grab collateral or even to take control of the 
borrower, in the case of a corporate loan. Therefore, the institutions that empower the 
bank to take such actions exert an influence on the lending behavior. As corruption 
adds to uncertainty for banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers, it 
should diminish their willingness to lend. 
Empirical evidence supports the role of laws on the books and  of  law 
enforcement on bank credit. While La Porta et al. (1997) observe that better legal 
protection of creditors favors  large-size debt markets, Levine (1998, 1999) and 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) show that better legal protection of lenders is 
associated with a higher ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP in cross-
country analyses.  By investigating the legal determinants of loan contract 
characteristics, Qian and Strahan (2007) also provide some support for this view with 
the finding that stronger protection of creditors on the books leads to lower loan rates 
charged by banks. 
While the latter argument focuses on judicial corruption, another argument for a 
detrimental impact of corruption on bank credit deals with corruption in lending. 
Indeed, corruption can also take place through bribes given to bank officials to receive 
a loan. Levin and Satarov (2000) notably explain how borrowers gave envelopes filled 
with cash to bank officials in Russia in the 1990s. Evidence of corruption in lending is 
widespread. In Russia, Levin and Satarov (2000) report figures  on criminal cases 
launched against employees of Russian banks in the 1990s.
3
                                                         
3 In April 2008, the Central Bank of Russia published a black list of bank managers sued for criminal 
activity and civil liability (Kommersant, April 2, 2008). 
 Regarding China, Barth 
et al. (2008) point out that 461 cases of bank fraud, each involving more than one 
million yuan, were uncovered in 2005. Corruption of bank officials may reduce bank   - 5 -  - 
 
 
credit through its impact on loan demand. By increasing the cost of a loan, it acts as a 
tax  on  borrowers  and  so  constitutes  an obstacle to finance.  The World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) by the World Bank provides evidence on this negative 
effect of corruption in lending, by questioning firm managers as to whether corruption 
of bank officials is an obstacle for the growth of business in a cross-country survey. 
Based on this survey, Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2004) observe that corruption of 
bank officials is considered a major or moderate obstacle by 20% to 30% of firms in 
regions of the world other than OECD countries. 
The above-mentioned arguments share the presumption that corruption may 
hamper bank credit. But corruption in lending might also be beneficial for bank credit 
in some cases. Indeed the argument according to which corruption in lending hiders 
bank credit considers that the bank official exploits his power in loan granting by 
demanding a bribe in exchange, which increases the cost of the loan. Nevertheless, the 
borrower may also be inclined to give a bribe to the bank official to enhance his 
chances to obtain a loan. In that case, corruption in lending may favor bank credit, as 
corruption “greases” bank lending. 
Borrowers’ incentives to offer bribes to obtain bank credit should increase with 
bank risk aversion. As risk aversion deals with the reluctance of banks to grant loans, 
greater risk aversion means more rejected loan applications. As a consequence, it 
increases the likelihood that borrowers would  pay bribes  to receive loans.  A 
theoretical argument can also be advanced to motivate the positive impact of 
corruption in lending on bank credit. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have indeed shown 
that adverse selection, resulting from ex ante asymmetry information between bank 
and borrower causes credit rationing in the sense that borrowers willing to pay greater 
loan rates than requested have rejected loan applications. The bank is motivated to do 
so to avoid adverse selection through attracting only bad borrowers. Nevertheless, the 
existence of credit rationing suggests that some borrowers are willing to pay more 
than the loan rate to obtain credit. As a consequence, they have incentives to pay 
bribes to bank officials to obtain the loan. One important point however is that only 
risky borrowers have an  incentive to behave like this, in accord with the adverse 
selection mechanism. Indeed the safe borrowers are not willing to pay more. In that 
sense, by circumventing the obstacles to obtain a loan from the bank, corruption in 
lending might increase bank lending by favoring only bad loans.   - 6 -  - 
 
 
We are not aware of any  empirical support for this positive influence of 
corruption on bank credit. Nevertheless, the opposite view of a negative impact can be 
qualified by the observation of Beck et al. (2006, p.938) that “corruption of bank 
officials is rated as only minor obstacle” in their investigation based on WBES data 
on the determinants of financing obstacles in a sample of 80 countries. They notably 
point out that half of the surveyed firms consider corruption of bank officials not to be 
an obstacle. While this observation may be interpreted as the absence of corruption in 
lending,  it  may  also  be interpreted as  supporting  the  idea  that the presence  of 
corruption of bank officials is not necessarily considered an obstacle to financing. 
Consequently, the conflicting arguments stress the question whether the 
negative effect of corruption can be offset in situations where bank credit is rationed 
particularly owing to a high degree of bank risk aversion. There is however very little 
empirical evidence on this issue. In their investigation of the role of foreign bank 
penetration on bank credit, Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) include a measure 
of corruption as a control variable and observe that corruption is negatively associated 
with private credit. Therefore, we tackle the question of knowing empirically whether 
corruption fosters or hampers bank credit in the following sections. 
 
III. Country-level analysis 
This section examines the empirical impact of corruption on bank credit at the 
country level. To this end, we proceed to cross-country regressions of bank credit on a 
set of variables including corruption and a wide range of control variables. 
 
III.1 Estimation approach 
The explained variable is Bank Credit, defined as the ratio of total credit issued 
to private enterprises by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. 
The data are from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000). This variable is widely 
used in cross-country studies on bank credit (e.g. Beck and Levine, 2004; Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007).  
The explanatory variable of primary concern is corruption. We alternatively use 
two measures of corruption: the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by 
Transparency International (Corruption-CPI), and the World Bank’s index of 
corruption (Corruption-WB).  Both indices are commonly used in studies on 
corruption (e.g. Méon and Sekkat, 2005). They are composite indices aggregating   - 7 -  - 
 
 
surveys based on information from risk analysts and residents. As they differ in the 
sets of basic indicators  of corruption that they aggregate and in the aggregation 
method, they complement each other.  The CPI is available directly  from the 
Transparency International website. It ranges from zero, the most corrupt situation, to 
ten, the least so. For clarity reasons, we use reverse the index scale so that higher 
values indicate more corruption. The World Bank’s index is from Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2007). It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating less 
corruption. We rescale this index from 0 to 10 such that, again, higher values indicate 
more corruption. 
Both of these measures treat  corruption as a whole and do not distinguish 
between judicial corruption and corruption in lending.  The World Business 
Environment Survey however provides information on corruption in lending. As 
mentioned above, this cross-country survey of firm managers includes a question on 
the role of corruption of bank officials as an obstacle to the growth of business. While 
this dataset has been used in some studies to measure corruption in lending (e.g. Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2006), it suffers from a major limitation for our work, as 
bank corruption is considered detrimental in the wording of the question. Such a prior 
is completely at odds with our investigation of the relevance of this assertion, so we 
cannot use this measure for our estimations. 
To assess the strength of the link between corruption and bank credit, we control 
for other potential determinants of bank credit in our regressions, following the earlier 
studies. As in the study by Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) on the effect of inflation 
on financial development, we include the inflation rate, defined as the consumer price 
index growth rate  (Inflation). As Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2003) have 
shown that latitude helps explain financial development, we include Latitude, defined 
as  the country’s distance from  the equator.  Openness to trade is also taken into 
account by the ratio of trade to GDP (Trade), following Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001). Economic development is controlled with the variable GDP per 
capita, defined as the logarithm of GDP per capita. 
Finally, we include variables for legal origin, which has been shown to influence 
financial development (La Porta et al., 1997). We add dummy variables to indicate 
whether the legal origin is French, German, Scandinavian, or Socialist. The dummy 
variable for English legal origin is dropped. We do not include a measure of law 
enforcement, as this is highly correlated with corruption. Nevertheless, the inclusion   - 8 -  - 
 
 
of legal origin variables in the estimations enables  control for the impact of law 
enforcement and law on the books, as legal origin is a determinant of these 
characteristics (La Porta et al., 1997). 
The data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, with the 
exception of legal origin variables, from  La Porta et al. (1999). All variables are 
computed as a 5-year average (2001 to 2005)
4
 
, to smooth out business cycle effects, 
with the exception of constant  variables controlling for latitude and legal origin. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in table 1. 
III.2 Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the cross-country regressions of bank credit, 
for  indices of corruption from Transparency International and World Bank 
respectively.  We performed  four  estimations  in  testing different combinations of 
country-level variables. The first estimation includes Inflation, Latitude, and Trade 
(column 1). The second estimation includes additionally legal origin variables. As 
notably shown by La Porta et al. (1997), legal origin influences law enforcement. The 
third estimation adds economic development (GDP per capita) to the initial set of 
variables  (column 3).  As the relationship between corruption and economic 
development gets strongly support from the literature, there is a risk that the inclusion 
of this latter variable eliminates the significance of the index of corruption.
5
The major finding is the negative  coefficient of  the corruption variable 
(Corruption-CPI  and  Corruption-WB), which is significant at the 1% level in all 
regressions. The presence of legal origin variables and of economic development in 
the explanatory variables does not remove the significance of the corruption variable, 
which  indicates  the robustness of corruption influence  on bank credit. Thus, we 
support the view that corruption hampers bank credit. This conclusion is in line with 
earlier studies on the role of legal institutions – law on the books and law enforcement 
- on financial development (La Porta, 1997, 1998; Levine, 1999; Djankov, Mc Liesh 
and  Shleifer, 2007), according to which bad legal institutions hamper financial 
development. 
 Finally, 
the fourth estimation includes all country-level variables (column 4). 
                                                         
4 Due to data limitations, both corruption indices are averaged over four years (from 2002 to 2005). 
5 For similar reasons, La Porta et al. (1997) do not include GDP per capita as control variables in their 
regressions of size of debt and equity markets on legal variables, including the rule of law.   - 9 -  - 
 
 
In addition, all control variables are either intuitively signed or insignificant. We 
observe that Inflation is significantly negative, which is in line with the conclusion of 
Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) that greater inflation reduces bank lending. Trade and 
Latitude  are not significant  in most estimations. GDP per capita  is  significantly 
positive,  as expected, in accord with the observed link between economic and 
financial development (e.g Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). Finally, the results for 
legal origin variables show that the amount of bank credit is less in the French legal 
origin and Socialist legal origin countries than in those with English legal origin, as 
observed also by La Porta et al. (1997, 1999). 
Next, we examine separately developed and developing countries. Corruption 
may differently impact bank credit in the various stages of economic development. 
We redo our estimations for both groups of countries, with both corruption variables. 
The set of control variables does not include GDP per capita, as economic 
development is taken into account with the separation of countries in two groups. We 
use the World Bank definition of groups of countries to divide  our sample.  The 
developed country subsample includes high income and upper middle income 
countries, while lower middle income and low income countries are classified as 
developing countries. The results displayed in table 4 suggest that the negative impact 
of corruption on bank development is not driven by either subsample. Indeed we 
observe this finding for both groups of countries and so conclude that corruption 
weakens bank credit in both developed and developing countries. 
 
IV. Bank-level analysis 
We have shown above that corruption hampers bank lending at the country 
level. But corruption in lending could enhance bank lending in some cases. This may 
indeed result from the eagerness of borrowers to obtain loans. In that case, corruption 
may contribute to increase bank lending. Such behavior should be particularly 
relevant in situations in which bank managers are risk-averse, as greater risk aversion 
reduces borrowers’ chances of obtaining loans and thus strengthens their incentive to 
pay bribes. We now turn to a bank-level analysis to investigate these questions. 
 
IV.1 Estimation approach 
The purpose of the bank-level investigation is twofold: to check the relevance of 
country-level results and to analyze whether the effect of corruption on lending is   - 10 -  - 
 
 
dependent on bank risk aversion.  We use bank-level data from the Bankscope 
database of BVD-IBCA. In investigating the propensity of banks to grant loans, the 
explained variable is the ratio of loans to total assets (Loans to Assets).  The 
explanatory variable of primary concern is again corruption, as defined as above. We 
use three bank-level control variables to control for bank characteristics. The ratio of 
deposits to total assets (Deposits to Assets) is included in the estimations, as the 
sources of financing can influence banks’ lending behavior. Furthermore, we take into 
account bank size, measured as the logarithm of total assets (Size), owing to possible 
differences in activities between small and big banks. 
Risk aversion is proxied by the ratio of bank equity holdings in excess of capital 
requirements to  total assets  (Risk Aversion).  To compute this measure, we used 
information on the minimum capital to asset ratio requirement from Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004), which was updated for 2005. However capital requirements imply that 
banks must have a certain amount of capital relative a weighted sum of their risky 
assets, so that the capital adequacy ratio would be more relevant. But unfortunately 
this ratio is not available for the vast majority of banks in our database. Our measure 
of bank risk aversion however represents an improvement vis-à-vis  earlier studies 
such as Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), which use the ratio of equity to 
total assets to measure banks’ risk aversion. Indeed this latter ratio is a measure of 
capitalization rather than risk aversion, as it does not take regulation on minimum 
equity into account. Therefore, we improve this measure of risk aversion by 
considering only equity in excess to prudential minima. 
We also include several country-level variables described above to control for 
the macroeconomic environment: Inflation,  GDP per capita, and the legal origin 
variables. Dummy variables for  each year are also included, to control for yearly 
effects. We adopt the Tukey box plot based on interquartile range to eliminate outliers 
from the sample. Banks with observations outside the range defined by the first and 
third quartiles that are greater or less than twice the interquartile range were 
eliminated for each ratio employed (loans to assets, deposits to assets, risk aversion). 
Our sample then included 30,520 observations (bank-year) on banks located in 98 
countries. Descriptive statistics of the bank-level variables are displayed in table 1. 




We start the bank-level estimations with a series of regressions of bank lending, 
reported in table 5. We use alternatively both corruption measures and two sets of 
control variables  to check the sensitivity of the results.  The key finding is the 
significantly negative coefficient of the corruption variable, which means that banks 
in countries with greater corruption have a lower ratio of loans to total assets. This 
supports, at bank-level, our conclusion for the country-level that corruption induces 
banks to lend less. 
Turning  to the control variables, we note  the negative coefficient of Risk 
Aversion. This intuitive finding supports the view that the more risk-averse banks lend 
less. Size is significantly negative, suggesting that larger banks have a lower share of 
loans in their assets. This result is in line with the greater diversification possibilities 
for large banks. The negative sign of Deposits to Assets suggests that banks relying 
more on deposits are not those that do the most lending. As observed for the country-
level, the inflation rate exerts a negative influence on the lending activity of banks, as 
shown by the negative sign of Inflation. Legal origin variables provide an interesting 
pattern, as they all are significantly positive. Therefore, banks from countries with no 
English legal origin have a higher ratio of loans to assets. As corruption and risk 
aversion are controlled, this result may come from the strongest involvement of banks 
in investment assets in countries with English legal origin where financial markets are 
generally more highly developed. 
We now turn to a second set of estimations,  in which we seek to examine 
whether the degree of bank risk aversion exerts an impact on banks’ lending behavior. 
We consequently add an interaction term between corruption and degree of risk 
aversion in the estimations displayed in table 6. We observe that the coefficient of 
Corruption is still significantly negative. But the remarkable finding is the positive 
and significant coefficient of the interaction term Corruption × Risk Aversion. This 
supports the view that the negative impact of corruption on bank lending is reduced 
when the degree of bank risk aversion is greater. This finding is observed in all of the 
estimations. 
This is a fundamental result, as it tends to qualify the detrimental effects of 
corruption on bank lending. Indeed, we have mentioned above that corruption in 
lending may come from borrowers being willing to enhance their chances to obtain a 
loan. In that sense, such behavior by borrowers should be more likely in the presence   - 12 -  - 
 
 
of greater bank risk aversion, resulting in a lower volume of bank loans. Therefore, 
corruption may grease the bank officials to help borrowers obtain loans and then 
reduce the detrimental impact of banks’ reluctance to grant loans. 
A natural question that emerges from this finding concerns the existence of 
cases in which corruption could foster bank lending. Indeed, as greater bank risk 
aversion reduces the detrimental effects of corruption on bank lending, risk aversion 
might be great enough to allow a positive impact of corruption. In this connection, we 
compute  the overall effect of the corruption index on bank lending. The overall 
coefficient of the corruption index is the sum of the coefficient for Corruption and the 
coefficient for the interaction term Corruption × Risk Aversion multiplied by the value 
of risk aversion. 
Let us for instance focus on the estimation with the CPI measure of corruption 
and the largest set of control variables in table 6, keeping in mind that the results are 
similar to those for the other specifications. As the coefficient for Corruption is -
0.009 and the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.169, the overall coefficient for 
the corruption index is positive for values of Risk Aversion  greater than 0.009  / 
0.169 ≅ 0.053. The analysis of our sample shows that about 17% of the observations 
have values of Risk Aversion greater than this threshold. As a consequence, our results 
suggest that corruption can be beneficial to bank lending when banks have high risk 
aversion. 
 
Nevertheless, the observation that corruption can favor bank lending does not 
mean that it is associated with welfare gains. Indeed, even if bank lending has been 
shown to favor growth, one wonders whether increased bank lending resulting from 
corruption is not accompanied by an expansion of bad loans. Namely, bribes given by 
borrowers may help to obtain loans by circumventing excessively risk-averse bank 
officials. But they may also favor loans with excessive risk. Risk aversion may be 
optimal in the sense that bank managers adjust their degree of risk aversion according 
to the quality of loan applications. Therefore risk aversion could not be excessive in 
the sense that banks’  reluctance  to  grant  loans would result from excessive fear 
relative to the contents of loan applications. In that case, bank risk aversion would 
never constitute an impediment to “good” loans. The theoretical predictions of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) support the view that corruption may increase bank lending by   - 13 -  - 
 
 
favoring excessive risk-taking by banks and therefore the share of bad loans in their 
loan portfolios. As only risky borrowers are willing to pay more than the loan rate 
proposed by the bank, all borrowers willing to pay a bribe to bank officials to obtain a 
loan should be risky borrowers. In their analysis of corruption in the Czech Republic, 
Lizal and Kocenda (2001, p.150) observed that “In the banking sector corruption is 
associated with the provision of loans for unreasonable or even non-existent projects. 
Such practices even led to the collapse of several banks.” Corruption may therefore 
favor bank lending by expanding the volume of bad loans. 
To investigate this issue, we redo the estimations by considering the ratio of 
performing loans, i.e. the difference between total loans and nonperforming loans, to 
total assets (Performing Loans to Total Assets) as the explanatory variable. These 
regressions are displayed in table 7.  The sample  now  includes about 10 000 
observations, because of the absence of information on nonperforming loans for many 
observations in Bankscope. Nevertheless, the size of the sample remains satisfactory 
and includes enough countries (70) to perform the relevant estimations. We estimate 
both with and without the interaction term, and we use both measures of corruption 
and consider the largest set of control variables in all estimations. 
The coefficient of  the corruption variable is negative and significant in all 
estimations, meaning that corruption reduces the share of performing loans in assets. 
This result is in line with our finding that corruption reduces the share of loans in 
assets. However the key finding again is a positive and significant coefficient for the 
interaction term between corruption index and bank risk aversion, while the 
coefficient for the corruption index is significantly negative.  This  suggests that 
corruption is less detrimental to the ratio of performing loans to assets when bank risk 
aversion is greater. 
As a consequence, our findings do not support the view that corruption may 
favor bank lending only by increasing bad loans. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the 
corruption variable is greater in absolute value in the estimations explaining  the 
performing loans to assets ratio than in those for the loans to assets ratio. This finding 
suggests that corruption hampers good loans more than bad loans. To dig deeper into 
these results, we compute the overall effect of the corruption index on the ratio of 
performing  loans to total assets.  We again  focus  on the estimation with the CPI 
measure of corruption. As the coefficient for Corruption is -0.042 and the coefficient 
for the interaction term is 0.255, the overall coefficient for the corruption index is   - 14 -  - 
 
 
positive for values of Risk Aversion greater than 0.042 / 0.255 ≅ 0.165. Only 1.1% of 
the observations have values of Risk Aversion greater than this threshold. This means 
that corruption increases the ratio of performing loans to assets for some banks with 
high risk aversion. Nevertheless, corruption does raise this ratio for far less banks than 
was the case for the ratio of loans to assets. 
This is an important result in terms of welfare, as it supports the view that 
corruption may favor lending of good  loans in the  case of great risk aversion. 
Consequently, as financial development has been shown to promote growth (e.g. 
Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000), corruption might facilitate growth in situations with 
high levels of bank risk aversion. Thus our findings are at odds with the extensive 
literature on legal institutions and financial development, which supports the view that 
bad  institutions hamper financial development. Our results tend to indicate  that 
corruption can enhance bank lending in situations where banks are strongly reluctant 
to grant loans, owing to risk aversion. This finding can be related to the “grease the 
wheels” hypothesis, according to which corruption may be beneficial in a second best 
world. While this hypothesis is based on the idea that corruption helps circumvent 
impediments induced by inefficient public administration, we provide support 
regarding how corruption helps circumvent bank risk aversion to obtain loans. In this 
sense, corruption greases the wheels of bank lending. 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we analyze the effect  of corruption on bank  lending. This 
neglected issue is at the crossroad of the literature on the consequences of corruption 
and that on the determinants of bank credit. As bank lending has been shown to favor 
growth, such probing furthers our understanding of the potential effects of corruption 
on economic development. 
At first glance, corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as corruption is 
associated with less protection of creditors. Nevertheless, this view only considers 
judicial corruption, while corruption in lending may be beneficial for bank credit if 
bribes given to bank employees favor the granting of the loan. Corruption greasing the 
wheels of banks is more likely if banks have great risk aversion, leading to more 
rejected loan applications.   - 15 -  - 
 
 
Country-level estimations are favorable to the view that corruption hampers 
bank lending. Therefore macro evidence supports a similar influence of corruption on 
bank credit as one finds for legal determinants such as  law  on the books or law 
enforcement  (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007). At first glance, bank-level 
estimations confirm this finding with a negative impact of corruption on bank lending. 
However additional estimations show a subtler impact, as the  detrimental role of 
corruption  is  weakened when bank risk aversion increases. Corruption may be 
beneficial for bank lending for some high levels of bank risk aversion. In addition, we 
observe that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. 
We obtain empirical results that qualify the consensual view on the negative 
effects of corruption, by showing that corruption softens the financing constraints 
resulting from bank risk aversion. This finding that corruption greases bank officials 
to help borrowers to obtain loans may  be related to the “grease the wheels 
hypothesis”, according to which corruption may alleviate distortions caused by ill-
functioning institutions.  While this hypothesis was developed to explain how 
corruption may circumvent inefficiencies from defective public administration, our 
rationale is that corruption helps to obviate possible inefficiencies due to excessively 
risk-averse banks. 
A possible policy implication of our findings is that countries with highly risk-
averse banks may benefit in terms of increased bank lending from allowing for an 
expansion in corruption. This inference is however risky and incorrect. Corruption 
does not exert an impact on growth solely through bank credit and is thus likely to 
hamper growth. Furthermore, a high degree of bank risk aversion  hampers  bank 
lending and may be influenced by well-designed policies. Therefore, encouraging 
countries to fight corruption by considering also how to reduce excessive bank risk-
aversion constitutes a safer option for enhancing bank lending. Future work could 
well  broaden and deepen our understanding of the impact of corruption on bank 
lending. 
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Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Means and standard deviations of variables used in estimations. Sources: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) for Bank Credit;  Transparency International website for Corruption-CPI;  Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2007) for Corruption-WB; La Porta et al. (1999) for Legal Origin; World Development Indicators for 
Inflation, Trade Openness, Latitude and GDP per capita; Bankscope for all bank-level variables except for Risk 
Aversion; Risk Aversion computed by the authors with bank-level information from Bankscope and information 
on capital requirements from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). 
 
 
Variable  Description  N  Mean  Std Dev. 
Country-level variables       
Bank Credit  Ratio of credit issued to private enterprises 
by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP, avg for 2001-2005 
138  0.4694  0.4299 
Corruption-CPI  Corruption Perception Index from 
Transparency International, rescaled from 0 
(most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), avg for 
2002-2005 
135  5.6717  2.1804 
Corruption-WB  Corruption Index from the World Bank, 
rescaled from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least 
corrupt), avg for 2001-2005 
138  4.8399  2.0416 
Inflation  Consumer price index growth (in %) 
averaged over 2001-2005 
138  5.4717  5.2605 
Trade  Ratio of trade to GDP (in %), avg for 2001-
2005 
138  88.8505  53.4032 
Latitude  Distance from equator  138  25.4574  16.9737 
GDP per capita  Logarithm of GDP per capita at PPP in 2005 
avg values for 2001-2005 
137  8.6324  1.2914 
French legal origin  Dummy variable equal to one if legal origin 
is French 
138  0.4783  0.5013 
German legal origin  Dummy variable equal to one if legal origin 
is German 
138  0.0362  0.1875 
Scandinavian legal 
origin 
Dummy variable equal to one if legal origin 
is Scandinavian 
138  0.0362  0.1875 
Socialist legal origin  Dummy variable equal to one if legal origin 
is Socialist 
138  0.1377  0.3458 
Bank-level variables       
Loans to Assets  Ratio of loans to total assets  30,521  0.5625  0.2208 
Deposits to Assets  Ratio of deposits to total assets  30,521  0.8045  0.1425 
Size  Logarithm of total assets  30,521  13.3797  1.8724 
Risk Aversion  Ratio of excess equity (equity-min  capital 
requirement) to total assets 
30,521  0.0051  0.0552 
Performing Loans to 
Assets 
Ratio of the difference between total loans 
and non-performing loans to total assets 
10,544  0.5384  0.2011 
 




Country regressions with Corruption-CPI 
 
OLS regressions for Bank Credit. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Table reports coefficients 
with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% 




Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








































French Legal Origin  -  -0.087 
(1.59) 
-  -0.112** 
(2.08) 
German Legal Origin  -  0.219 
(1.64) 
-  0.190 
(1.46) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -  -0.240 
(1.64) 
-  -0.188 
(1.30) 
Socialist legal origin  -  -0.241** 
(2.49) 
-  -0.222** 
(2.36) 




Adjusted R²  0.6089  0.6380  0.6366  0.6611 
N  135  135  134  134 
 
 




Country regressions with Corruption-WB 
 
OLS regressions for Bank Credit. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Table reports coefficients 
with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








































French Legal Origin  -  -0.093* 
(1.82) 
-  -0.114** 
(2.22) 
German Legal Origin  -  0.218* 
(1.68) 
-  0.196 
(1.54) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -  -0.180 
(1.29) 
-  -0.145 
(1.04) 
Socialist legal origin  -  -0.212** 
(2.26) 
-  -0.207** 
(2.25) 




Adjusted R²  0.6297  0.6529  0.6437  0.6667 
N  138  138  137  137 
 





Developed countries vs. Developing countries 
 
OLS regressions for Bank Credit. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. German Legal Origin and 
Scandinavian Legal Origin variables have been dropped for estimations on developing countries for 
multicollinearity reasons. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  Corruption-CPI  Corruption-WB 
  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed 
















































German Legal Origin  -  0.068 
(0.42) 
-  0.077 
(0.48) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -  -0.399** 
(2.15) 
-  -0.366** 
(2.02) 








Adjusted R²  0.0656  0.5722  0.0921  0.5861 
N  75  60  78  60 







OLS regressions  for  Loans to Assets.  Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 
at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for years are included but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  Corruption-CPI  Corruption-WB 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















































French Legal Origin  -  0.035*** 
(6.76) 
-  0.039*** 
(7.99) 
German Legal Origin  -  0.075*** 
(15.58) 
-  0.073*** 
(15.27) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -  0.183*** 
(23.15) 
-  0.180*** 
(23.29) 
Socialist legal origin  -  0.048*** 
(6.65) 
-  0.059*** 
(8.27) 
GDP per capita  -  -0.010 
(2.75) 
-  -0.017*** 
(5.22) 
Adjusted R²  0.0587  0.0754  0.0590  0.0764 
N  30,521  30,058  30,521  30,058 
 





Estimations with the Interaction term 
 
OLS regressions for Loans to Assets.  Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Table reports 
coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 
at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for years are included but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  Corruption-CPI  Corruption-WB 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























































French Legal Origin  -  0.038*** 
(7.37) 
-  0.041*** 
(8.43) 
German Legal Origin  -  0.068*** 
(14.21) 
-  0.066*** 
(13.71) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   -  0.204*** 
(25.64) 
-  0.200*** 
(25.70) 
Socialist legal origin  -  0.048*** 
(6.61) 
-  0.056*** 
(7.86) 
GDP per capita  -  -0.015*** 
(4.20) 
-  -0.020*** 
(6.13) 
Adjusted R²  0.0638  0.0837  0.0637  0.0844 
N  30,521  30,058  30,521  30,058 
 





Estimations with the Performing Loans Ratio 
 
OLS regressions for Performing Loans to Assets. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Table 
reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for years are included but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
  Corruption-CPI  Corruption-WB 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




















-  0.302*** 
(15.88) 








































































Adjusted R²  0.2092  0.2263  0.2176  0.2362 
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